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Abstract: Starting from a comparative and economic perspective, this article aims to 
assess the efficiency of recent reforms of civil procedure, especially focusing on Italian 
and French experiences.
On the one hand, it underlines that convergences in European Countries regulatory 
actions in the field should not be overestimated: even equal reforms may end up 
with different outcomes, because of differences in the starting backgrounds (whether 
economical or cultural). 
On the other hand, it casts doubts about the effectiveness of regulations imposing 
ADR mechanisms as a pre-condition to legal proceedings or providing for appeals 
selection: as Positive Law and Economics shows, mandatory mediation or conciliation 
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is unlikely to overcome parties cognitive bias, while side effects brought by skimming 
mechanisms may undermine their benefits.
Rather, starting from the assumption that parties estimates of the process outcome 
strongly affect their choice between settlement and litigation, it is suggested that 
Supreme Courts jurisprudence plays a fundamental role in determining incoming 
flows, and that its inconsistency increases demand inflation.
Keywords: Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms – Economic analysis of process 
– Nomofilachia – Stare decisis – Supreme Courts 
Abbreviations 
Cons. Stato – Italian Consiglio di Stato 
c.p.c. – Italian Codice di procedura civile
CPC – French Code de procédure civile
c.p.p. – Italian Codice di procedura penale 
CPP – French Code de procédure pénale
CPR – United Kingdom Civil Procedure Rules
COJ – French Code de l’organisation judiciaire
ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights
FRCP – United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Loi J21 – French Loi n° 2016-1547 du 18 novembre 2016 de modernisation de la justice 
du XXIe siècle
ord. giud. – Italian Ordinamento giudiziario (R.D. 30 gennaio 1941, n. 12)
SC - Supreme Court
SDER – Service de documentation, des études et du rapport (at French Cour de cassation)
UKSC Rules – United Kingdom Supreme Court Rules
ZPO – German Zivilprozessordnung
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I. CONVERGENT SOLUTIONS, DIVERGENT OUTCOMES
Convergences have long been pointed out in the regulatory actions taken by 
European (and not only) countries in order to contain costs and (more often) length 
of legal proceedings1.
Limiting the field of investigation to Italy and France, the tendency – in both 
cases – is to focus on ADR mechanisms to divert the demand (upstream) and on so-
called filters to appeals in order to expel proceedings started from the judicial circuit 
(downstream). Notwithstanding the fact the second has so far adopted a globally less 
defensive approach, Italian proceedings may take twice or three times as much as French 
ones2. It is therefore not surprising that, according to World Bank’s ranking in terms 
of enforcing contracts, France and Italy occupy the 15th and 108th place respectively, 
despite their global positioning in not so wide apart (respectively, 31st and 46th place)3.
The question thus arises as to the reasons of such a gap, but the answer is equally 
natural: there is no “one-fits-all solution”, so that regulations successfully taken abroad 
must work in Italy too.
Such a conclusion appears even more valid with reference to the phenomenon 
at stake, which is affected by a large number of intertwined variables, whose different 
starting consistency and interaction can explain outcomes deviations, even when 
following similar reforms.
In spite of these considerations, however, justice is perceived to be in crisis in 
both Countries; and their common basic model of Court of Cassation could arguably 
be the key to understand why.
1. Suffice here to mention the papers collected in A.A.S. Zuckerman (ed.), Civil Justice in Crisis, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999).
2. See, for Italy, Corte Suprema di Cassazione - Ufficio di Statistica, La cassazione civile. Annuario 
statistico 2017, 10 gennaio 2018, p. 44 http://www.cortedicassazione.it/cassazione-resources/
resources/cms/documents/ANNUARIO_CIVILE_2017.pdf, and Ministero della giustizia, https://
giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_14_1.page?facetNode_1=0_10_37&contentId=SST1263302&previsious
Page=mg_1_14; for France, Cour de Cassation, Rapport annuel 2017, https://www.courdecassation.
fr/publications_26/rapport_annuel_36/rapport_2017_8791/livre_4_activite_cour_8816/i._
activite_juridictionnelle_8817/bis._donnees_statistiques_8840/1._activite_generale_8841/delai_
contentieux_39620.html and Ministère de la Justice, Les chiffres-clés de la Justice 2018, p. 11, http://
www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/justice-chiffres-cles-2018.pdf, last accessed on 01.11.2018.
3. Source: http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings, last accessed on 01.11.2018.
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In particular, while a review of the measures so far introduced (or suggested to 
be introduced) under the economic analysis of the process casts doubts about their 
efficacy, it is suggested that one of the main causes of justice demand inflation is SCs’ 
inability to fulfil a nomophylactic function.
II. BRIEF NOTES ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW: RATIONAL CHOICE, 
BOUNDED HEURISTICS AND COGNITIVE BIAS 
The analysis of the effectiveness of legislative interventions aimed at reducing 
the demand flow cannot overlook a brief introduction to the mechanisms governing 
parties choices according to the Positive Law And Economics.
In principle4, the decision-making process behind the determination of a subject 
to become a plaintiff (P) in judgment, can be expressed with the elementary equation:
probability of winning x monetary value of the judgement – costs = reservation price P
Specularly, the defendant (D), who has to decide whether to resist or not in 
Court, will calculate:
probability of losing x monetary value of the judgement + costs = reservation price D
where reservation price P indicates, at the same time, what the plaintiff expects 
to gain from a judgment in his/her favour, but also the minimum sum that s/he would 
be willing to accept in order to settle the case; while reservation price D represents 
the value of the hypothetical unsuccessfulness for the defendant and, therefore, the 
maximum amount s/he would be willing to offer so that the plaintiff would give up 
the action5. Assuming that the transaction costs are null, it is therefore apparent that 
a transaction will only be possible6 if
reservation price D – reservation price P > 0
The difference between the two reservation prices is called settlement surplus, 
while the range of distribution possibilities is indicated as settlement range7. 
Since the monetary value of the judgement is mostly given (as it depends on the 
value of the claim), and starting from the assumption that parties are able to assess 
their chances at trial, it would seem logical to infer that «[a]nything that reduces the 
plaintiff’s minimum offer or increases the defendant’s maximum offer, such as an 
4. But see S. Shavell, Suit versus Settlement When Parties Seek Nonmonetary Judgments, The Journal 
of Legal Studies, p. 2 (1993), for cases in which the petitum is other than a sum of money.
5. R.A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, The Journal of 
Legal Studies, pp. 417 et seq (1973); R.G. Bone, Civil Procedure: The Economics of Civil Procedure, 
pp. 34 e 74 (New York: Thomson West, 2003). 
6. R.A. Posner, supra note 5, p. 417.
7. R.G. Bone, supra note 5, p. 74.
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increase in the parties’ litigation expenditures relative to their settlement costs, will 
reduce the likelihood of litigation»8. 
In short, rising litigation costs would seem to be the easier and – arguably – most 
effective way to push the parties towards an out-of-court settlement. But, apart from 
the fact that any excessive increase of Court fees and sanctions would contrast with 
the right to access to justice, the result might not be so obvious.
In fact, the mathematical formulas, however correct, can nothing when inputs 
are flawed; so, they must be supplemented by taking into consideration the biases 
and cognitive limits that can affect parties’ behaviour9. More specifically, the effects 
of a cost variation may be voided by any event or information that modifies parties’ 
estimate of their probability of winning/losing; and it is pretty sure that «trials will 
occur when one or both parties miscalculate [their] likely outcome»10.
Assuming the absence of information asymmetries, this happens when the parties, 
misinterpreting the information at their disposal, assume divergent expectations about 
the likely outcome of the trial. Such an estimate can be flawed by default – so-called 
mutual pessimism – so that parties will be more induced to the transaction, but also 
by excess – so-called mutual optimism11 –, in which case the settlement surplus is 
reduced, if not totally erased12, and so the chances of settling. It seems useful right 
away to note that divergent expectations are not necessarily due to the real merit 
of the claim, but rather to the state of the jurisprudence with respect to the specific 
question.
Furthermore, even if the parties are able to make reliable estimates as to the 
outcome of the proceedings, it is necessary to take account of the so-called hard 
bargaining (or strategic bargaining) 13, which – it is presumed – will be all the more 
incentivized, the greater the amount of the settlement range. Such a phenomenon 
is nothing but the translation of the prisoner’s dilemma into the field of settlement 
agreements14: in short, if both parties were collaborative during the negotiations, 
the surplus settlement would be allocated in an efficient manner (that is, through 
a division in equal parts), with maximum gain for the plaintiff and minimum loss 
for the defendant. On the other hand, if only one of the litigants adopted an 
aggressive strategy, it would be able to grab a larger share of the surplus: however, 
since parties do not know their opponent attitude, they will probably both adopt 
8. R.A. Posner, supra note 5, p. 418.
9. R.G. Bone, supra note 5, pp. 103 et seq.
10. R. Korobkin - C. Guthrie, Psychological Barriers To Litigation Settlement: An Experimental 
Approach, Michigan Law Review, p. 109 (1994).
11. Bone R.G., supra note 5, p. 85.
12. Bone R.G., supra note 5, pp. 87 et seq.
13. R. Korobkin - C. Guthrie, supra note 10, pp. 114 et seq.
14. Bone R.G., supra note 5, pp. 79 et seq.
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aggressive strategies, ending up agreeing on an inefficient allocation of the total 
amount at stake. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that the reasoning synthesized by the two 
equations is not carried out one-off by the parties, but repeated whenever – 
following an event of the procedure – they face the alternative whether to keep 
on or settle. So, if it is true that the new information arising from discovery during 
the process may lead their expectation come close together, it should also be noted 
that, as the proceedings go on and the parties sustain the related expenses, the 
amount already paid will not be included in the new equation: it is the so-called 
sunk-cost fallacy, a phenomenon that makes a person «continue an endeavor 
once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made»15, «often incur[ring] 
further losses (‘throw good money after bad’) or tak[ing] great risks in order to 
recover those losses».16
The consequence is that, paradoxically, if process costs are diluted during its 
course, the more the proceedings go on... the more it becomes convenient, for the 
parties, to keep on in turn. This means that, once the system has failed to divert 
parties from litigation, it is very unlikely that they chose to stop it without exhausting 
all possible appeals, because, on the one hand, costs will be re-calculated at any stage 
and, on the other hand, those incurred in the previous phases – if recoverable, as they 
usually are – will be added to the expected value of the new degree. It is thus possible 
to understand why even the new mechanisms of «overdeterrence»17 hardly fulfil their 
function and even (arguably) worthless causes can come up to the SC.
III. ADR MECHANISMS AS PRECONDITIONS TO LITIGATION 
The list of distortions is far from being exhausted18; however, the ones mentioned 
so far seem enough to carry out an evaluation of the legislatures imposing ADR 
mechanisms as preconditions to litigation.
Apart from assisted negotiation – introduced in Italy in 201419, drawing inspiration, 
but not enough, from French procédure participative de négociation assistée par 
15. H.R. Arkes - C. Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, Organizational Behavior And Human Decision 
Processes, p. 124 (1985); Bone R.G., supra note 5, pp. 36 et seq e 91 et seq.
16. S. Issacharoff - G. Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, The Yale Law Journal, 
p. 113 (1990). 
17. F. Auletta, L’ibridazione dell’«agire in giudizio»: «tutela dei propri diritti», «autonoma iniziativa 
[...] di interesse generale» e principi costituzionali di equilibrio del bilancio e di sussidiarietà, 
Giurisprudenza costituzionale, pp. 1557 et seq (2016).
18. See R. Korobkin - C. Guthrie, supra note 10, pp. 107 et seq; R.H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An 
Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, Ohio State Journal On Dispute Resolution, 
p. 235 (1993).
19. Artt. 2 et seq, d.l. 12 settembre 2014, n. 132 (converted by con l. 10 novembre 2014, n. 162); see, ex 
multis, F.P. Luiso, La negoziazione assistita, Nuove leggi civili commentate, pp. 649 et seq (2015); 
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avocat20 – the reference is to mediation, firstly introduced in Italy in 201021 and 
declined in three forms: voluntary, delegated and mandatory. The latter, although 
declared unconstitutional (due to an excess of delegation22, but with a judgement 
that seemed suggesting a certain opposition to the Council as to the use of the 
mechanism for deflationary purposes23) was reintroduced in 2013; so, in the cases 
referred to in art. 5, d.l. 28/2010, a mediation attempt is a precondition for taking 
legal action, and the inadmissibility due to non-compliance can also be detected by 
the Court on its own motion.
The same is provided, in France, by art. 4 Loi J21, with only reference to cases 
of «saisine du tribunal d’instance par déclaration au greffe», ie for disputes whose 
value do not exceed € 4,000; in any other cases24, since 2015, any plaintiff before 
a civil jurisdiction must give account, since the application, of the «diligences 
entreprises en vue de parvenir à une résolution amiable du litige», unless s/he is 
able to justify his/her non-compliance because of the urgency or the particular 
subject at stake25. Such a provision recalls the one envisaged by paragraph 3(c)(d) 
of the UK Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct And Protocols, but, differently 
from this latter, its violation does not bring any penalty: pursuant to art. 127 CPC, in 
fact, non compliance only permits the Court to suggest «une mesure de conciliation 
ou de médiation». 
However, since any precondition (even when mandatory) cannot bar, but only 
postpone the starting of a trial, it is unlikely to significantly affect the choice between 
transaction and litigation.
D. Dalfino, La procedura di negoziazione assistita da uno o più avvocati, tra collaborative law 
e procédure partecipative, Foro italiano, pp. 43 et seq (2015).
20. See C. Silvestri, La circolazione nello spazio giudiziario europeo degli accordi di negoziazione 
assistita in materia di separazione dei coniugi, cessazione degli effetti civili del matrimonio, 
Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile, pp. 1 et seq (2016); Id., L’esperienza francese 
della « elasticità » del processo civile. Un esempio per il legislatore italiano, ivi, pp. 741 et 
seq (2018).
21. D.lgs. 4 marzo 2010, n. 28; see, among others, M.A. Lupoi, Ancora sui rapporti tra mediazione 
e processo civile, dopo le ultime riforme, Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile, pp. 13 
et seq (2016); C. Consolo, La improcrastinabile radicale riforma della legge-Pinto, la nuova 
mediazione ex d.lgs. n. 28 del 2010 e l’esigenza del dialogo con il Consiglio D’Europa sul rapporto 
fra Repubblica italiana e art. 6 CEDU, Corriere giuridico, pp. 430 et seq (2010).
22. C. Cost., 6 dicembre 2012, n. 272, Foro italiano, pp. 1091 et seq (2013), annotated by R. Romboli; 
Società, pp. 71 et seq (2013), annotated by F.P. Luiso, L’eccesso di delega della mediazione 
obbligatoria e le incostituzionalità consequenziali; Corriere giuridico, pp. 257 et seq (2013), 
annotated by I. Pagni, Gli spazi e il ruolo della mediazione dopo la sentenza della Corte 
costituzionale 6 dicembre 2012, n. 272.
23. F.P. Luiso, supra note 22, p. 80.
24. In addition, art. 7 Loi J21 introduced an experimental mandatory mediation in family matters, in 
some jurisdictions. 
25. Artt. 56 e 58 CPC, as modified by Décret n° 2015-282 du 11 mars 2015.
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Of course, it takes away from the parties the chance to evaluate the suitability to 
start negotiations – and to profit from the jeux de signal and jeux de filtrage26 – and, by 
postponing the moment of the (always possible) judicial decision, it increases the cost 
(of time) of the process (which equates to the damage deriving from the unavailability 
of the amount at stake), making it less attractive; moreover, it is possible that, following 
the mediator’s proposal, the parties recalculate their chances of success27. On the other 
hand, however, negotiation and mediation usually bring costs too, and the predictive 
effect of the conciliatory proposal depends on the calculability of the jurisprudence. 
In addition, and above all, the same cognitive errors that can spoil the (free) choice 
between the two alternatives may still affect parties’ behaviour when one of the 
options is (temporarily) unavailable.
Italian art. 13, par. 1, d.l. 28/2010 would seem sharper, since it sets forth – similarly 
to Rule 68 (d) FRCP – that, when the content of the judgment is exactly the same as 
the one of the proposal refused by the winning party, this latter cannot recover the 
expenses s/he incurred after the proposal; furthermore, s/he has to reimburse those 
incurred by the respondent during the same period, and has to pay an additional sum 
to the State budget. Such a proviso, indeed, directly affects the costs estimate and, 
consequently, the rational evaluation of its suitability.
Yet, even in this case, the theory mismatches the practice, that cannot disregard 
the subjective side of the assessment: as it has been demonstrated with reference to the 
aforementioned Rule 68 (d), the mechanism tends to increase the settlement rate only 
when the parties exclusively disagree about the quantum, while explaining the opposite 
effect if the different evaluations concern the an and / or the chances of success28.
And it is precisely with reference to this last element that the role of appeals is 
at stake.
IV. APPEALS SELECTION: GENERAL REMARKS 
Italy and France share a traditional vision of the process, taken as a whole, as 
articulated in three degrees: the first judgement may be followed by up to two appeals 
(the first one historically posed as novum iudicium, while the second – to the Court of 
Cassation – limited to legitimacy). However, the current nightmare of the «reasonable 
time»29 (art. 6, § 1, ECHR) makes it easy to understand the appeal exercised by foreign 
26. See N. Chappe, Les enseignements de l’analyse économique en matière de résolution amiable 
des litiges, Négociations, p. 79 (2008); R. Deloche, Transaction, jugement et théorie des jeux. 
Evaluation et application, Revue économique, pp. 977 et seq (2001).
27. N. Chappe, Economie et Résolution des Litiges, pp. 26-27 (Paris : Economica, 2005).
28. K.E. Spier, Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules, RAND Journal of Economics, 
pp. 197 et seq (1994); v. anche R. Deloche, supra note 26, pp. 980 et seq.
29. Recalling G. Verde, Il processo sotto l’incubo della ragionevole durata, Rivista di diritto processuale, 
pp. 505 et seq (2011)’s expression.
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models – the British system in the first place – which, on the contrary, strongly limit 
access to appeal degrees.
Anyway, in spite of the long-standing convergences reported in this field as 
well, any attempt to transplant foreign institutions seems intended to fail, when not 
coupled with a correct understanding of the original cultural background and with the 
compatibility assessment of the Country of destination30. 
Indeed, concerning the United Kingdom, it should not be forgotten that the 
principle of proportionality in the use of judicial resources permeates the process 
from the first degree 31 while, with reference to the permission to appeal before the 
SC, the need for efficiency32 is entwined with the traditional deference that appeal 
judges show to the judgment of the lower courts33, both in fact34 and in law35. This 
is apparent from the wording of the UKSC Practice Direction 3.3.3, which states that 
«[p]ermission to appeal is granted for applications that, in the opinion of the Appeal 
Panel, raise an arguable point of law of general public importance which ought to be 
considered by the SC at that time, bearing in mind that the matter will already have 
been the subject of judicial decision and may have already been reviewed on appeal»36.
These consideration may be extended to Germany, where a filter of access 
to Revision is historically rooted, since it existed since the adoption of the ZPO, in 
1879; while, when the Parliament decided to establish a barrier to the first appeal, it 
simultaneously proceeded – ad instar of the British system – to reaffirm the centrality 
of the first degree judgment37.
Apart from these comparative remarks, it should be added, from an economic 
point of view, that the establishment of an appeals selection mechanism needs to 
deal with a number of factors. First of all, the idea that, in appellate proceedings, 
the public interest38 must prevail over the parties’, neglects the (social) function of 
30. G. Verde, Questione giustizia, p. 13 (Torino: Giappichelli, 2013).
31. See CPR 1.1(2)(e). See R. Caponi, Il principio di proporzionalità nella giustizia civile: prime 
note sistematiche, Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile, pp. 389 et seq (2011); J. Sorabji, 
English Civil Justice After The Woolf And Jackson Reforms: A Critical Analysis, pp. 161 et seq 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); A. Panzarola, Il principio di proporzionalità tra 
utilitarismo anglosassone e codici processuali attuali, Rivista di diritto processuale, pp. 1459 et 
seq (2016).
32. See UKSC Rules 2(2) e 2(3).
33. S. Dalla Bontà, Contributo allo studio del filtro in appello, pp. 17 et seq (Trento: Editoriale 
Scientifica, 2015).
34. Smith New Court Securities v. Scrimgeour Vickers [1996] UKHL 3.
35. Piglowska v. Piglowski [1999] UKHL 27.
36. Emphasis added. 
37. S. Dalla Bontà, supra note 33, pp. 47 et seq.
38. Whether, in general, the efficient distribution of the judicial system scarce resources or, with specific 
reference to the last degree, the protection of the ius constitutionis.
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reduction of the «costs of legal error», which constitutes (not the only, but) one of 
the necessary purposes of the appeal degree39. From this perspective, indeed, the 
«astuzia» of counting on individual interest – the one of the losing party – in order 
to achieve, at a higher level, the implementation of the objective law, on which 
Calamandrei relied40, appears to be the happy intuition of the economic concept 
of «effect» or «equilibrium of separation», according to which the most efficient 
method to check on the correctness of a judgement is to leave to the parties the task 
of appealing it, if necessary41.
With more specific reference to intermediate degrees, then, it has been 
emphasized their ability to perform a dual function for the benefit of the higher 
Courts: the first – temporary – occurs when a new échelon juridictionnel is introduced 
ex novo, because it allows «un trasfert mécanique de charges des juridictions supérieurs 
vers les nouvelles juridictions», correspondingly relieved of a part of the litigation42; 
the second – standing – relies on their skimming function with respect to the upper 
step43. And these considerations should be kept in mind not only before any proposal 
– whether deemed iconoclastic44 or not – to suppress the appeal degree tout court, 
but also before any suggestion to simply limit it. In fact, filter mechanisms risk to de 
facto take away the appeal degree, while failing to achieve the time and cost savings 
that would result from a de iure abolition.
As for the skimming criterion, it has been pointed out that «[s]creening costs 
will be lower if the criteria are easier to apply by the parties and by the judge»45: this 
would mean, instead of a discretionary parameter (such as the one required by Italian 
art. 348-bis c.p.c.46), it would be preferable to limit access according to the value 
of the dispute; but this solution too is not totally efficient, since «[t]he minimum-
amount-in-controversy approach is the equivalent of an infinite filing fee for cases 
below the minimum and a zero filing fee for cases above it»47. This is consistent with 
the German Illustrative Report accompanying the bill introducing the filter to appeal, 
39. R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis Of Law3, p. 550 (Boston: Wolters Kluwer, 1986); S. Shavell, The 
Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 379 et seq (1995).
40. P. Calamandrei, La Cassazione civile, II, in Id., Opere Giuridiche, VII, p. 137 (Napoli: Morano, 1979).
41. S. Shavell, supra note 39, pp. 384 et seq; B. Szego, L’inefficienza degli appelli civili in Italia: regole 
processuali o altro?, Mercato concorrenza regole, p. 285 (2008).
42. J.-M. Belorgey, La situation générale du temps des procédures devant les juridictions, in Coulon 
J.M. - Frison-Roche M.A., Le temps dans la procédure, p. 7 (Paris : Dalloz, 1996).
43. A. Proto Pisani, Il ricorso per cassazione in Italia, Foro italiano, pp. 188 et seq (2015).
44. M. Cappelletti, Parere iconoclastico sulla riforma del processo civile italiano, Giurisprudenza 
italiana, pp. 81 et seq (1969); Id., Doppio grado di giurisdizione: parere iconoclastico n° 2, o 
razionalizzazione dell’iconoclastìa?, ivi, pp. 1 et seq (1978).
45. M. Barendrecht - K. Bolt - M. de Hoon, Appeal Procedures: Evaluation and Reform, p. 23 (Tilburg: 
TILEC Discussion Paper DP 2006-031, 2006).
46. See infra, paragraph 5.
47. R.A. Posner, supra note 39, p. 547.
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which highlighted how unreasonable would have been to invariably prevent access 
to the appeal when the value at stake was below a given amount48.
Finally, whatever the chosen criterion, «[l]eave for appeal leads to cost savings 
only if the number of cases in which appeal is not allowed is sufficiently high to 
compensate for the extra screening costs»49.
If these warnings may be kept in mind while evaluating the efficiency of the 
selection mechanisms of all kind of appeals, it seems appropriate to analyse the first 
appeal and the appeal to the Court of cassation separately.
V. FIRST APPEAL
The French legal landscape has so far been lacking real skimming mechanisms: 
this is certainly true with reference to the civil appeal50, although some Authors51 
have deemed to find a sort of filter in the radiation du rôle (ex art. 526 CPC), ordered 
by the Appellate Court when the unsuccessful party has not complied with the 
first judgement, unless it appears that «l’exécution serait de nature à entraîner des 
conséquences manifestement excessives ou que l’appelant est dans l’impossibilité 
d’exécuter la décision». 
There is no doubt that such a proviso – which inverses the ordinary rule of the 
suspensive effect of the appeal52 – explains a deterrent effect of unmeritorious appeals, 
that could have otherwise been proposed to mere dilatory purposes; but, apart from 
the different consequences linked to the striking out of the appeal – given the possibility 
of réinscription de l’affaire au rôle – and to the refusal of grant a real permission to 
appeal, the discretion granted to the judge in the assessment of circumstances that 
prevent the radiation appears qualitatively and quantitatively different from the one 
that is inherent in the appraisal of the reasonable probability of reversing the first 
judgement (as required by Italian art. 348-bis c.p.c.)53. 
48. S. Dalla Bontà, supra note 33, p. 49, note 5.
49. M. Barendrecht - K. Bolt - M. de Hoon, supra note 45, p. 23.
50. See S. Maffei, L’appello nel diritto francese e belga, in Cecchella C. (dir.), Il nuovo appello civile, 
pp. 345-346 (Bologna: Zanichelli, 2017); S. Dalla Bontà, supra note 33, pp. 30 et seq. By contrast, 
in criminal procedure, art. 186-1 CPP provide for a non-admission mechanism, which is applied by 
Court of appeal’s chambre de l’istruction.
51. F. Ferrand, L’évolution récente de l’appel civil en droit français, Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess 
International, p. 59 (2009) ; S. Dalla Bontà, supra note 33, p. 36.
52. R. Perrot, Les effets de l’appel en droit français, in J. van Compernolle - A. Saletti (dir.), Le double 
degré de juridiction, pp. 278 et seq (Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2010). But Ministère de la Justice, 
Chantiers de la Justice. Les axes de la réforme, p. 7 (2018), http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/
dp_chantiers_justice_20180308.pdf, announced its intention to «reconna[ître] le caractère exécutoire 
de la décision de première instance pour que les décisions de justice s’exécutent rapidement».
53. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, with reference to art.1009-1 CPC, regulating the radiation 
du rôle in Cour de cassation proceedings, when the appeal judgement is not complied with: see 
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In addition, if it is true that the extreme consequences to which radiation 
can lead (the pérention de l’instance54, if compliance does not take place within 2 
years55) risk to undermine the right of defense of the losing parties belonging to the 
weaker classes56, it has also been correctly underlined57 that provisional execution 
is granted at the risk and peril of the party requesting it, as it can be inferred from 
the fact that art. 517 CPC allows the judge to grant the enforceability upon condition 
of a guarantee «suffisante pour répondre de toutes restitutions ou réparations»58. 
Moreover, Appellate Courts interpretation of the exemption conditions from radiation 
must take into account the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 
in the same way the Cour de cassation (before which the radiation du rôle has been 
introduce since 1999) does.
On the other hand, if – as already mentioned – a link must be identified between 
the conception of the first instance proceedings and the selection of appeals, in the 
sense that this latter is only admissible (or, in any case, desirable) if the first degree is 
assigned a central role, one of the reasons behind a past (but unsuccessful) proposal 
to repeal the suspensive effect of the appeal precisely relied on the fear that otherwise 
parties would continue to consider the first degree as an «étape préparatoire, où l’on 
se met en jambe, sans grande conséquence», since «la véritable instance [à] prend[re] 
au sérieux [aurait été] celle qui se déroulera devant la cour»59. 
However, as seen, the suspensive effect stands, so as the opening of the appeal 
proceedings to the nova (art. 563 CPC), who survived the décret n°2017-891 du 6 mai 
2017, which has instead tightened the devolutive effect of the appeal by modifying 
art. 561 CPC.
The situation is very different in Italy, and in both respects; but, while the 
introduction of the provisional enforceability of the first judgement60 effectively had 
positive reverberations (albeit temporary) on the incoming flow, this has not been the 
case for the ban on the nova61.
G. Canivet, L’organisation interne de la Cour de cassation favorise-t-elle l’élaboration de sa 
jurisprudence?, in N. Molfessis (dir.), La Cour de cassation et l’élaboration du droit, p. 14 (Paris : 
Economica, 2004).
54. Art. 383, par. 2, CPC.
55. Art. 386 CPC.
56. See, ex multis, P. Galliere, La justice victime de la chasse aux appels dilatoires, Gazette du Palais, 
pp. 6 et seq (3 déc. 2005).
57. C. Hugon, La radiation du rôle sanctionnant l’inexécution d’une décision judiciaire : un nouveau 
miroir aux alouettes ?, Recueil Dalloz, pp. 1640 et seq (2006).
58. A. Moreau, L’exécution provisoire, un avantage dangereux pour le créancier poursuivant, Recueil 
Dalloz, p. 524 (2006).
59. R. Perrot, supra note 52, pp. 279.
60. Art. 283 c.p.c., as modified by l. 26 novembre 1990, n. 353.
61. B. Szego, supra note 41, pp. 297 et seq.
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Art. 348-bis, par. 1, c.p.c., by contrast, firstly introduced – in the civil process62 – the 
so called inammissibilità meritale (ie, based on the merits of the case), by allowing the 
Appellate Court to declare the appeal non-admissible if it does not have a reasonable 
probability of success.
Such a mechanism is aimed to expel the undeserving appeals from the queue, so 
as to allow the Courts of Appeal to dedicate their (scarce) resources to cases in which 
a reform of the first judgement is more likely63; but it may give rise to perplexities to 
the extent that it ends up ensuring a rapid definition precisely to (probably) hopeless 
appeals.
In fact, although such a perspective seems to underestimate the need to protect 
the unfairly appealed party by stabilizing the judgement’s effects, the expectations 
in the filter could be downsized, if only one consider the parallel between this 
mechanism and the planning rule known – in the field of the economics applied to 
engineering – as «shortest operation next»64, according to which the operations to 
be performed are processed in increasing order of duration; in this way, the total 
working time remains the same, but the individual waiting times are minimized. 
However, even the studies in the field warn that such a criterion should be used in 
combination with others65, both because it does not necessarily lead to an optimal 
result, and in order to avoid incurring the so-called starvation, that occurs when 
«several threads that consist entirely of short jobs and that together present a load 
large enough to use up the available processors may prevent a long job from ever 
being run»66. 
Translating the concept in the field of litigation, the risk is that a generalized 
application without any corrective measure will end up by the contingencies of 
unfounded appeals paradoxically leading to an increased waiting time of the meritorious 
ones.
The point can be illustrated with a trivial example: given two appeals only, 
where A, proposed first, requires three hearings to be decided, while B (probably 
unfounded) needs only one hearing, the total time to exhaust both – whatever the 
order of treatment – will be 4 hearings.
However, following the chronological order, one would graphically have the 
situation for which
62. But such a category has long been known in criminal procedure: see art. 606, par. 3, c.p.p.
63. M. Pacilli, L’abuso dell’appello, passim (Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2015).
64. R.E. Stein, Re-Engineering the Manufacturing System: Applying the Theory of Constraints, p. 
27 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
65. S.C. Cimorelli – G.Chandler, Control Of Production and Materials, in R. Crowson (ed.), Factory 
Operations: Planning and Instructional Methods, p. 216 (Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis, 2005).
66. J.H. Saltzer - M.F. Kaashoek, Principles of Computer System Design: An Introduction, p. 355 
(Burlington: Morgan Kaufmann, 2009).
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Hearing 1 Hearing 2 Hearing 3 Hearing 4
A A A B
so, A would be decided after 3 hearings; B after 4 hearings, with a total waiting 
time of 3 + 4 = 7 hearings. The average duration of the proceedings would then be 
7/2 = 3.5 hearings.
Vice versa, by implementing the filter, the order would be
Hearing 1 Hearing 2 Hearing 3 Hearing 4
B A A A
with the consequence that A would be decided after 4 hearings; B after 1 hearing, 
with a total waiting time of 1 + 4 = 5 hearings and an average duration of 5/2 = 2.5 hearings.
In the first case, A’s waiting time does not increase, while B suffers a delay 
of 3 hearings; in the second, it is only A who has to wait for a hearing more than 
necessary; and these data, together with those related to the average duration in 
the two cases, should clearly point to the solution that adopts the filter. However, 
this kind of reasoning in numerical terms only appears possible if the two appeals 
are both considered worthy of the same use of public resources; by contrast, if, as it 
is argued, the skimming mechanism rest on a judgment of (dis)value expressed by 
the law in relation to abusive appeals, it appears contradictory that their removal is 
accomplished at the others expenses.
In truth, the problem is softened by the applicability, even on appeal, of the 
decision model set forth by art. 281-sexies c.p.c67, that theoretically (ie: provided that 
the judge has full knowledge of the file since the first hearing) allows, since 2011, a 
quick definition of the causes with a clear outcome (whether affirming or vacating the 
previous judgement); but then, there would be all the appeals that cannot be exhausted 
in a single hearing to be postponed, regardless of their seniority and of the merit of 
the arguments. And with respect to them, as long as the hearing schedule is organized 
according to the parallel work method68, there seem to be no possible alternatives.
VI. FURTHER APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT 
Contrary to appeal, the Cour de cassation has historically known mechanisms 
for the selection of appeals69, albeit always more or less unsuccessful: suffice 
here to say that the chambre des requêtes70, although established – in 1790 – to 
67. Art. 350, last par., c.p.c..
68. On the suitability of sequential work, see D. Coviello - A. Ichino - N. Persico, Time Allocation and 
Task Juggling, American Economic Review, pp. 609 et seq (2014).
69. V. G. Canivet, supra note 53, pp. 3 et seq e 13 et seq.
70. For further information, see SDER, La chambre des requêtes (création, évolution, suppression), 
(2016), https://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/54_SDER_Chambre_requetes_1116.pdf, last accessed 
on 01.11.2018.
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regulate the flood of appeals by checking in advance their (sole) admissibility, often 
ended up carrying out a thorough examination of the merit of the grievance71. The 
consequence was that any appeal that overcame the first (expensive) screening 
was then subject to the new (double) review of the Chambre in charge of the 
decision.
If the foregoing makes clear the reasons of suppression of the chambre des 
requêtes in 1947, it should be noted that the mechanism has to some extent been 
taken over by the so-called non-admission des pourvois72, which entrusts to a 3-judges 
panel (formation restreinte) the task of declaring the inadmissibility of the «pourvois 
irrecevables ou non fondés sur un moyen sérieux de cassation». With a corrective, 
however: the formation restreinte, in fact, is endowed with the power of «statu[er] 
lorsque la solution du pourvoi s’impos[ait]» (art. 131-6 COJ73). This may explain the – 
initial – limited success of the mechanism, that led to an average one-month reduction 
of the definition time during 2002-2003; but the time savings have progressively 
decreased, to settle down, from 2007 onwards, around -0.2 / -0.5 months74, probably 
because, even this time,
[c]ontrairement à une idée parfois répandue, la procédure de non-admission n’est 
pas un mécanisme de filtrage des pourvois qui priverait les parties du droit d’accéder 
à une formation juridictionnelle. Elle n’est pas, non plus, un mécanisme d’examen 
sommaire et rapide des dossiers. En réalité, l’instruction d’une affaire, qui se solde 
par une décision de non-admission, ne diffère pas de celle d’une affaire achevée par 
un arrêt motivé75.
In the light of these very humble results – which confirm that a selection 
mechanism is only suitable if applicable to a large portion of the total claims – it is 
difficult to agree with the recent proposal by the Cour de cassation, which, in advancing 
the introduction of a filtrage des pourvois, has put forth the idea of entrusting the 
skimming to a restricted panel set up within the same Chambre at whose hearing the 
appeals bypassing the filter should be remitted.
In fact, despite the editors of the étude d’impact seem to be well aware of the 
drifts of the chambre des requêtes (as they were in 2017, when the SDER stressed 
71. A. Lacabarats, Le moyen sérieux, gennaio 2010, in www.courdecassation.fr; S. Sonelli, L’accesso alla 
Corte suprema e l’ambito del suo sindacato, p. 148 (Torino: Giappichelli, 2001). 
72. Introduced by Loi organique n° 2001-539 du 25 juin 2001.
73. After the repealing of art. 131-6 COJ by Ordonnance n°2006-673 du 8 juin 2006, see, nowadays, art. 
1004 CPC.
74. J.-M. Sommer - B. Munoz-Perez, Dix ans de non-admission devant les chambres civiles de la Cour 
de cassation (2002-2012), p. 28 (2014), https://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG///10ansdeNAdevant
leschambrescivilesCC_140307.pdf last accessed on 01.11.2018.
75. V. Vigneau, Le régime de la non-admission des pourvois devant la Cour de cassation, Recueil 
Dalloz, p. 103 (2010).
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that «la procédure dite de “non-admission” n’est pas un mode de filtrage»76), they 
inexplicably connect the risk of a déjà-vu only to the hypothetical constitution of a 
special chamber77. Quite the opposite, it is apparent that the danger of a double check 
arises whenever the skimming formation is not also the one judging on the appeals 
that overcome the screening: and this, according to the same Commission’s estimates, 
would occur in little less than half of the cases.
Indeed, the Commission identifies a «socle minimum» of appeals that would be 
predictably intercepted (54.5% of the total) by the filter, by simply adding data related 
to those presently given up by the plaideur following the denial of the benefit of the 
aide juridictionnelle (already linked to an estimate on the presentation of moyens de 
cassation serieux)78 to the number of the current rulings of inadmissibility and manifest 
groundlessness pronounced with rejet non spécialement motivé, of inadmissibility tout 
court and rejection «spécialement motivé [mais] qui ne donnent pas lieu à publication 
parce qu’elles ne présentent pas d’intérêt normatif». 
Of course, the calculation should ideally include even those cases in which the 
illegalité and irregularité, which are currently remedied, would not been corrected 
once the filter have raised the threshold of the required offensivity for the sanction 
of the defect; but the data should not be overestimated, provided that
en usant du deuxième critère (intérêt pour l’unification de la jurisprudence), les for-
mations ad hoc seront attentives à permettre à la Cour de sanctionner le plus grand 
nombre d’illégalités et d’irrégularités affectant les décisions qui leur sont soumises.79 
This confirms the feeling that the filter risks ending up into a mere burden of 
work80, without producing significant consequences regarding the quantity and type 
of appeals finally decided81.
76. SDER, Rapport de la commission de réflexion sur la réforme de la Cour de cassation, p. 262 (2017). 
https://www.courdecassation.fr/institution_1/reforme_cour_7109/reflexion_reforme_8630/
commission_reflexion_8182/reflexion_reforme_36784.html, last accessed on 01.11.2018.
77. Commission de mise en oeuvre de la réforme de la Cour de cassation, Volet « filtrage des pourvois 
». Projet d’étude d’impact, p. 19 (2018), https://www.courdecassation.fr/institution_1/reforme_
cour_7109/mise_oeuvre_propositions_reforme_8181/reforme_traitement_pourvois_8640/impact_
reforme_39002.html. 
78. Art. 7, par. 3, loi n° 91-647 du 10 juillet 1991.
79. Commission de mise en oeuvre de la réforme de la Cour de cassation, supra note 77, pp. 21-22.
80. As noted with respect to German Revision too: see P. Gottwald, Civil Justice Reform: Access, Cost, 
and Expedition. The German Perspective, in A.A.S. Zuckerman (ed.), supra note 1, p. 210.
81. Indeed, the same happened elsewhere: see, for the Taiwan Supreme Court, T. Eisenberg - K.-C. Huang, 
The effect of rules shifting supreme court jurisdiction from mandatory to discretionary—An 
empirical lesson from Taiwan, International Review of Law and Economics, pp. 4 et seq (2012); for 
the Dutch Hoge Raad, E. Mak, Case Selection in the Supreme Court of the Netherlands - Inspired 
by Common Law Supreme Courts?, European Journal of Current Legal Issues (2015), http://webjcli.
org/article/view/419/532, last accessed on 01.11.2018.
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On the other hand, if the proposal effectiveness is doubtful, it certainly – and 
despite the strong oppositions of the doctrine – does not contrast with any expressed 
constitutional limit.
The same conclusion would seem impossible with reference to Italy, where the art. 
111, par. 7, Cost. – which entrenches the right to appeal to the Corte di cassazione (the 
access to which has to be granted «sempre») – is seen as a sort of handicap affecting 
the system’s efficiency. Whether this view is shared or not, however, the constitutional 
proviso would seem to prevent the introduction of “filters” to the SC degree. And yet, 
this happened in 2009, with the introduction of a new hypothesis of inammissibilità 
meritale: according to art. 360-bis, n. 1, c.p.c., the appeal is not allowed when the 
appealed judgment is consistent with Corte di cassazione’s jurisprudence and the 
advanced grounds does not offer any reason to confirm or reverse it.
Now, even if one acknowledges the interpretation that legitimises a filter – but 
not necessarily the one referred to in art. 360-bis, n. 1, c.p.c.82 – by virtue of a balance 
with the principle of equality (art. 3 Cost.)83, the mechanism in itself appears to be 
economically inefficient. 
In fact, it is possible to recall many of the considerations already carried out with 
reference to French Court’s proposal and to the chambre des requêtes: whether the 
Sezione filtro is called to check if the appeal is affected by procedural defects (art. 375, 
par. 1, nn. 1 e 5, c.p.c.) or inammissibilità meritale (art. 360-bis, n. 1, c.p.c.), such an 
assessment does not deprive the Sezione semplice of the power to consider otherwise 
with reference to survived appeals. Thus, instead of being subject to an one-off review, 
all the appeals that go beyond the filter – and they seem to be many more than those 
estimated by the Cour de cassation84 – are double-checked.
In addition, and given the already pointed out diseconomy of complicated 
parameters, perplexities are likely to increase if one considers that compliance with 
jurisprudence is often set as the parameter of the non-admissions of the Cour de 
cassation (in spite of the absence of any regulatory provision allowing the Court to 
do so); and that it certainly constituted the reason behind more than one rejection 
(resulting from a merit screening, presumably the same carried out by the Sezione 
filtro) of the Italian SC, even before the introduction of art. 360-bis, n. 1, c.p.c.
From this point of view, the express provision of the filter – with the simultaneous 
charge for the Sezione filtro – may even appear as an involution: if a hypothesis, for 
82. In this sense, if correctly understood, A. Proto Pisani, Ancora a proposito di Cassazione civile e 
nomofilachia, Foro italiano, p. 265 (2018).
83. Lastly, A. Proto Pisani, Tre note sui «precedenti» nella evoluzione della giurisprudenza della Corte 
costituzionale, nella giurisprudenza di una Corte di cassazione necessariamente ristrutturata 
e nella interpretazione delle norme processuali, Foro italiano, pp. 286 et seq (2017).
84. In 2017, only 16% of total judgement ended up with a declaration of inadmissibility: see Corte 
Suprema di Cassazione. Ufficio di Statistica, La cassazione civile. Annuario statistico 2017, cit., 15.
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example, of “classical” inadmissibility, albeit escaped to the first screening, may be 
detected by the Sezione semplice without much effort85, a much higher degree of 
commitment is required when it comes to deny86 the discrepancy of the appealed 
judgement with a «jurisprudence» which must first be identified.
VII. STARE DECISIS OR NOMOFILACHIA PREVENTIVA? 
From a different point of view, someone saw the consecration of a «temperato» 
stare decisis in art. 360-bis, n. 1, c.p.c.87. In fact, the introduction of the rule, if possible 
– materially and juridically88 – would likely prove to be an efficient choice: neglecting 
for a moment the common law systems, where the principle, for its longevity, does 
not allow comparisons between a before and an after, it is useful to think of a Country 
until recently unrelated to this tradition: Brazil.
Here, the súmula – already known since 1960s as persuasive «one-sentence-
pronouncement of the judgments of the Court that states succinctly its interpretation 
of rules and of the Constitution»89 resulting from administrative proceedings90 – 
has become binding from 200491, moreover barring the appeal against consistent 
decisions. The difference with the Italian filter is striking, both with regard to the 
clarity of the selection criterion and to the truly skimming effect. By contrast, the 
other Brazilian proviso that subordinates the admissibility of the appeals to the 
requisito da repercussão geral did not have – as it was to be expected – significant 
effects92. 
85. And without the “waste” of a double ruling, as in the cases of a prima facie order of conflict 
admissibility before Italian Corte costituzionale, when followed by a (certainly not precluded) 
judgement of inadmissibility.
86. And this happened: see, for instance, Cass., Sez. trib., 18 novembre 2015, n. 23586, Repertorio Foro 
italiano, voce Cassazione civile, p. 1140 (2015).
87. C. Consolo, Dal filtro in Cassazione ad un temperato “stare decisis”: la prima ordinanza sull’art. 
360-bis, Corriere giuridico, pp. 1405 et seq (2010).
88. For a positive assessment, see F.P. Luiso, Sulla riforma del giudizio di cassazione – Il vincolo 
delle Sezioni semplici al precedente delle Sezioni unite, Giurisprudenza italiana, pp. 817 et 
seq (2003).
89. M.A. Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira, Reforming the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court: A Comparative 
Approach, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, pp. 99 et seq (2006).
90. Because precedent selection does not take place in the exercise of jurisdictional activity, but a 
posteriori: see A.S. Bruno, Bringing Uniformity to Brazilian Court Decisions: Looking at the 
American Precedent and at Italian Living Law, Electronic Journal Of Comparative Law, p. 3 (2007), 
http://www.ejcl.org/114/art114-3.pdf, last accessed on 01.11.2018. The mechanism is similar to 
zhidao anli (guidance cases o arrêts directeurs) introduced by Chinese SC since 2010: see W.J. Guo, 
Cases as a New Source of Law in China?: Key Features of and Reflections on China’s Case Guidance 
System, China Law and Society Review, pp. 61 et seq (2016).
91. Emenda Constitucional nº 45, de 8 de dezembro de 2004.
92. M.A. Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira - N. Garoupa, Stare Decisis And Certiorari Arrive To Brazil: A 
Comparative Law And Economics Approach, Emory International Law Review, p. 597 (2012).
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Following the recent reaffirmation and expansion of the binding effect of 
precedent93, it has been suggested that it may be equated to a positive externality94, 
due to its suitability to increase the predictability of judicial decisions, thus allowing 
the parties a better estimate of the outcome of the process95, which – as seen – is 
primordial in the evaluation of the opportunity to litigate or settle.
From this point of view, the same nomophylactic function of the Italian SC – but 
deemed as belonging to the French one too, in spite of the absence of a legal provision 
similar to art. 65 ord. giud.96 – may be seen (not only as the procedural projection 
of the principle of equality, but also) as a possible solution to the problem of the 
encombrement of the Courts. 
This does not change the assessment of either the technique chosen by the 
Italian conditores, nor the path proposed by the Cour de cassation, since the economic 
function of nomofilachia should not arguably be pursued through a – however set – a 
posteriori remedy, but rather through mechanisms designed to grant (at least to some 
extent) jurisprudence’s consistency.
With respect to this aim, if the legislator can little affect judicial behaviour, s/
he can act upstream, by granting the quality (also in the meaning of clarity) of laws. 
In this framework one can think, in Italy, to the advisory function (or, better, to the 
jurisdictio preventiva) 97 carried out by the Consiglio di Stato, whose opinions, like SC’s 
judgement, may improve law’s clarity, by giving an ex ante interpretation that, in turn, 
smoothes Court’s task98.
Failing such mechanisms, another abstractly effective solution is to anticipate 
as much as possible the interpretative intervention of the SCs: here the reference is 
obviously to the saisine pour avis (du Conseil d’Etat and) de la Cour de cassation99, 
93. Artt. 926-927 Código de Processo Civil, Lei n. 13.105, de 16 de março de 2015.
94. J.Jr. Borges Teixeira, Reduzindo os Custos: Os Precedentes Judiciais como uma Externalidade 
Positiva do Litígio, Civil Procedure Review, pp. 127 et seq (2018).
95. G.A. Baggenstoss, O Sistema de Precedente no CPC/2015: a calculabilidade das decisões judiciais 
pátrias como segurança jurídica defendida pela análise econômica do direito, Economic Analysis 
of Law Review, pp. 299 et seq (2017); R.A. Posner, supra note 39, p. 511. 
96. Stemming from art. 111-1 COJ: see L. Cadiet, L’organisation interne de la Cour de cassation 
favorise-t-elle l’élaboration de sa jurisprudence?, in N. Molfessis (dir.), supra note 53, p. 41.
97. The expression is used by Cons. Stato, sez. II, 11 giugno 1997, n. 1366, Consiglio di Stato, p. 1698 
(1998); Cons. Stato, Sez. II, 09 aprile 1997, n. 129, ivi, 152 (1998). 
98. L. Carbone, I pareri del Consiglio di Stato sulla riforma Madia: verso un’evoluzione delle funzioni 
consultive?, p. 67 (2017). https://www.giustizia-amministrativa.it/documents/20142/147937/
nsiga_4385155.docx/b7cf4f21-dc68-8969-acbe-49c68fc3f25d?version=, last accessed on 01.11.2018.
99. See, ex multis, H.M. Darnanville, La saisine pour avis du Conseil d’Etat et de la Cour de cassation, 
Actualité Juridique Droit Administratif, pp. 416 et seq (2001); R. Libchaber, La saisine pour avis, une 
procédure singulière dans le paysage jurisprudentiel (Avis C. cass. 22 nov. 2002; Avis CE 6 déc. 
2002), Revue trimestrielle de droit civil, pp. 157 et seq (2003); F. Zenati, La saisine pour avis de la 
Cour de cassation (loi n° 91-491 du 15 mai 1991 et décret n° 92-228 du 12 mars 1992), Recueil 
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which allows any Court of merit to stay the proceedings pending before it, in order 
to request a non-binding opinion from the Court on the interpretation of a provision 
laying down a «question de droit nouvelle, présentant une difficulté sérieuse et se 
posant dans de nombreux litiges» (art. 441-1, par. 1, COJ). The mechanism – which 
is obviously based on the persuasiveness of the opinion, rather than on its authority 
– has proven effective100, but it was underused101 (either because of the strict limits 
in which it is admitted, or due to the natural reluctance of lower judges to dismiss 
– symbolically if not juridically – the power to resolve the dispute). In any case, 
however, it has contributed to the Court’s awareness of the need for «convaincre 
les juridictions [du fond] de la justesse [de ses] positions»102 so that they can adopt 
them because persuaded. 
By contrast, perplexities arise when an obligation to comply with precedents 
is imposed ab externo, as Italian legislator seems to have done with art. 374, par. 3, 
c.p.c., albeit only referred to the Sezioni semplici within the SC: putting aside any 
theoretical discussion regarding the exact scope of the stare decisis in the various 
common law systems – and without mentioning the fact that such a rule postulates a 
hierarchical organization of the Courts, which is alien to our legal system – it should 
first be remembered that, in common law models, there was the judges themselves 
to self-impose the obligation to follow previous decisions, (among other things) to 
protect legal certainty. This consideration, on the one hand, explains that such a self-
restraint is held surmountable – at least by the higher Courts – when other needs so 
justify, and, on the other hand, induces to downsize the value of a single precedent.
Taking as reference point the US system – paradoxically closer than the British one 
to the continental model, as to the cogency of the principle of stare decisis –, it was 
emphasized that, when it comes to Courts of equal order, it is the subsequent judge 
that creates the precedent, by adhering to a previous ratio decidendi; furthermore, a 
true and proper norm – in the manner of Italian «principio di diritto»103, which, alien to 
the fact as it is, is more similar to an arrêt de règlement104 – can only be defined when a 
plurality of judges choose to comply with a precedent105. So far, nothing different than 
Dalloz, pp. 249 et seq (1992); C. Silvestri, La saisine pour avis della Cour de cassation, Rivista di 
diritto civile, pp. 495 et seq (1998).
100. C. Pelletier, Quinze ans après : l’efficacité des avis de la Cour de cassation, in AA.VV., Libres propos sur 
les sources du droit – Mélanges en l’honneur de Philippe JESTAZ, pp. 429 et seq (Paris: Dalloz, 2006).
101. This is probably the reason why the SDER had taken to issue avis spontanés, thus interpreting new 
texts of law before any saisine of the Court; the practice - arisen praeter legem - is however nowadays 
abandoned, given the strong perplexities raised by the doctrine as to its legitimacy: see N. Molfessis, 
Les avis spontanés de la Cour de cassation, Recueil Dalloz, pp. 37 et seq (2007).
102. G. Canivet, supra note 53, p. 19.
103. Art. 384, par. 1, c.p.c.
104. Prohibited in France by art. 5 CC.
105. W.M. Landes - R.A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, Journal of Law 
and Economics, p. 250 (1976).
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the Franco-Italian precedent, which is nothing but persuasive, whether horizontal106 or 
vertical; and, as judicial behaviour studies show, the choice of the precedent to follow 
depends on the second judge’s personal beliefs107 and expected reaction of the legal 
community108. This confirms both the opportunity, for the higher Courts, to convince, 
before doing it the hard way (ie by cassation) and Picardi’s intuition about judges’ 
legitimisation, which nowadays stems from their prestige and mutual interaction109. 
But, whatever the legal system of reference, the practical situation is the same 
with reference to higher jurisdiction’s precedents: the lower judge, when deciding, is 
physically free to conform or not; s/he only risks seeing his/her own dissident judgment 
vacated from the higher Court.
It seems, then, that the real incentive to follow precedents – either persuasive 
or binding – lies in the degree of certainty of the sanction, or, in other words, in the 
estimate of the probability that the judgement will be overturned110. And if this 
assessment may appear problematic when «[t]he appellate judge cannot correct all 
[the] “mistakes” [...] because the appellate court’s jurisdiction is discretionary and many 
appeals are not heard»111, it could be much less aleatory in systems where, unlike in 
the common law, the exhaustion of all degrees of appeal is the norm. 
Provided that one could count on a uniform jurisprudence of the higher Courts.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
If this is true, it is arguably possible to reassess – theoretically, as it still seems 
to clash with Italian constitutional principles112 – the idea of the “obligation” for the 
Sezioni semplici to follow the dictum of the Sezioni unite (art. 374, paragraph 3 °, cpc 
), and thus to understand the paradox of providing for «un vincolo per così dire in 
106. B. Cavallone, Sulla citazione dei «precedenti» negli scritti forensi, Rivista di diritto processuale, 
pp. 150 et seq (2018); L. Cadiet, supra note 96, p. 47.
107. A. Niblett - A.H. Yoon, Judicial disharmony: A study of dissent, International Review of Law and 
Economics, pp. 60 et seq (2015).
108. S. Harnay - A. Marciano, Judicial conformity versus dissidence: an economic analysis of judicial 
precedent, International Review of Law and Economics, pp. 405 et seq (2004).
109. N. Picardi, La giurisdizione all’alba del terzo millennio, p. 195 (Milano: Giuffrè, 2007)
110. R.A. Posner, The problems of jurisprudence, p. 224 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); S. 
Shavell, supra note 39, p. 426; T.J. Miceli - M.M. Cosgel, Reputation and judicial decision-making, 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, pp. 31 et seq (1994).
111. E. Bueno De Mesquita - M. Stephenson, Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial Communication, 
American Political Science Review, p. 757, (2002).
112. F. Auletta, Profili nuovi del principio di diritto (il « vincolo delle sezioni semplici al precedente 
delle sezioni unite »), in E. Fazzalari (ed.), Diritto processuale civile e Corte Costituzionale, pp. 3 
(Napoli, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2006), et seq; Id., Note intorno alla prima applicazione del 
c.d. «vincolo delle sezioni semplici al precedente delle sezioni unite», Giustizia civile, pp. 769 et 
seq (2008); Id., ... il sole e l’altre stelle: è la giurisdizione quella del «sistema» dell’ABF?, Banca, 
borsa e titoli di credito, pp. 794 et seq (2018).
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senso verticale e un vincolo assoluto in senso orizzontale»113, which is not imposed 
on the lower Courts, but operates only within the same Corte di cassazione: while in 
common law systems there is only a handful of supreme judges, who consequently 
grant a basically coherent jurisprudence (so that the assessment of the lower Court can 
be based on solid elements), the plethoric formation (and production) of the Italian 
(and French) SC is a clear source of contrasts, which do not allow similar calculations 
to the Courts of merit.
Nor, upstream, to the parties: in fact, when the synchronic uncertainty is coupled 
to a diachronic one (due to the jurisprudence volatility), aggravated by the (too long) 
time necessary for a case transiting from the first degree to the one of legitimacy 
(and during which the wrong party could profit on a temporary victory, granted by 
a judge persuaded by the “wrong” precedent), it is apparent how parties’ estimate 
of the probability of winning becomes uncertain, or otherwise distorted: absent any 
lato sensu objective data to draw their valuation from, litigants are left at the mercy 
of their heuristic fallacies.
So, if it is true that the settlement is always preferable to judgment; that the more 
parties’ estimates about the likely outcome of the process are closer, the greater the 
likelihood of an agreement; that these assessments (whether autonomous or caused 
by a possible conciliatory proposal) cannot rationally be based on other than the ruling 
of Courts who have the last word; then, the coherence of the SCs could be the most 
effective of dispute avoidance mechanism. 
The problem is that, in order to reach such a consistency, revising the code is 
not enough.
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